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ABSTRACT. Tax incentives and the tax policy as a whole are components of a system 
of solutions that are aimed at the economic climate improvement while establishing 
special economic zones (SEZ). The most common instruments of the tax policy are tax 
exemption, lower tax rates and tax concessions. One of the key issues of SEZs’ perfor-
mance is the effectiveness of tax advantages applied in particular zone. The purpose of 
this study is to examine methods of assessing of tax incentives effectiveness in special 
economic zones. The study includes overview of existing approaches to tax incentives 
assessing in SEZs, which have been divided into the following groups: estimation of tax 
incentives effects on individual territorial development indicators, and comprehensive 
estimation of tax incentives effectiveness in a SEZ. The authors identified subjects of 
estimations, described each methodology and summarized the results. The authors fo-
cused their attention on and classified econometrical and statistical methods among the 
numerous approaches to assessing of tax incentives effectiveness in SEZs, which were 
built upon a variety of economic, and mathematical research techniques. The paper 
describes a method known as “difference in differences” that is widely implemented 
by scholars to estimate the effect of tax incentives in SEZs on individual territorial de-
velopment indicators. This work also covers an effect of using tax incentives when con-
ducting a comprehensive evaluation of tax advantages. It is also proposed a classifica-
tion of quantitative indicators of tax incentives effectiveness in special economic zones. 
The study makes it possible to implement obtained results in assessing tax incentives 
effectiveness in the further development of Russian territories. 
KEYWORDS. Special economic zones; effectiveness of tax incentives; methods of 
assessing the effectiveness of tax incentives. 
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АНАЛИТИЧЕСКИЙ ОБЗОР МЕТОДОВ ОЦЕНКИ ЭФФЕКТИВНОСТИ 
НАЛОГОВОГО СТИМУЛИРОВАНИЯ ОСОБЫХ ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКИХ ЗОН
АННОТАЦИЯ. Налоговые льготы, как и налоговая политика в целом, являются 
частью комплекса мер, направленных на улучшение инвестиционного клима-
та при создании особых экономических зон (ОЭЗ). При этом наиболее распро-
страненными инструментами налоговой политики являются освобождение от 
уплаты налогов, применение пониженных налоговых ставок и предоставление 
налоговых льгот. Один из важнейших вопросов функционирования ОЭЗ — эф-
фективность предоставляемых налоговых льгот. Цель исследования — изуче-
ние методов оценки эффективности налогового стимулирования в таких зонах. 
В статье проводится анализ практик оценки налогового стимулирования ОЭЗ, 
которые были разделены на группы: исследование влияния налоговых льгот 
на отдельные показатели развития территорий и комплексные оценки эффек-
тивности налогового стимулирования в ОЭЗ. Выделяются объекты исследова-
ния, описывается методология его проведения и обобщаются результаты. Сре-
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Relevance of the study
Special economic zones had become 
popular instrument of spurring develop-
ment and attracting foreign investment 
in the past few decades and found a wide 
application globally. According to the 
International Labour Organization, the 
number of special economic zones grew 
from 176 in 46 countries in 1987 to 3 500 
in 130 countries in 2007. The success of 
economic transformations in Singapore, 
South Korea and Hong Kong are often at-
tributed to SEZs [1]. The most common in-
struments of the tax policy are tax exemp-
tion, lower tax rates and tax concessions. 
The success of the East Asian countries 
inspired many developing countries, in-
cluding some countries in Africa, to es-
tablish various types of enterprise zones. 
However, some zones discrepant results. 
Tax incentives were often criticised for 
destroying tax base and shrinking budget 
revenues without any significant effect on 
investment inflow. This gives rise to nu-
merous approaches to assessing the effec-
tiveness and impact of various factors on 
the operational performance of SEZs. 
Literature review
The present study of the problem of 
assessing of tax incentives effectiveness in 
special economic zones includes an over-
view of existing approaches to tax incen-
tives assessing in SEZs, which were built 
upon a variety of economic and mathemat-
ical research methods. The scholarly inves-
tigation of tax advantages in SEZs was di-
vided into the following parts: estimation 
of tax incentives effect on individual ter-
ritorial development indicators, and com-
prehensive evaluations of tax incentives ef-
fectiveness in SEZ. Studies of tax incentives 
effect on individual development indica-
tors are presented in Table 1. 
Research by A. Klemm and S. Van Pa-
rys [2] proves that investments respond to 
tax incentives and tax reductions as a re-
sult of competition between countries. The 
scholars employ a spatial lagged model 
with fixed effects estimated using instru-
mental variable assessment considering the 
distance between neighboring countries. 
The analysis use macroeconomic and insti-
tutional data. The authors analyze relative 
effect of corporate income tax rate reduc-
tions versus tax holidays or investment 
allowances offered by developing coun-
tries. They prove that the tax incentives en-
courage financial competition. The study 
takes account of the distance between the 
countries and the effect of tax regimes in 
the neighboring countries. The findings 
suggest that countries react to changes 
in corporate income tax rates or tax holi-
day terms that have been offered by other 
countries, rather than to tax credits.
The second model was employed by 
the authors to analyze the effect of three 
tax incentives — the reduced CIT rate, 
tax holidays and investment tax cred-
its — on private investment and foreign 
direct investment. None of the variables 
affect private investment, while FDI 
crowds out domestically-financed invest-
ment. The analysis uses macroeconomic 
and institutional data as well as effective 
tax rates (Chen and Mintz [10]). The au-
thors used a dynamic panel model that 
includes an estimator derived by the gen-
eralized method of moments in order to 
ди множества подходов к оценке эффективности налогового стимулирования 
ОЭЗ, базирующихся на самых разнообразных методах экономико-математиче-
ских исследований, изучены и классифицированы эконометрические и стати-
стические методы. В работе описывается метод «разность разностей», активно 
используемый исследователями для оценки влияния налоговых льгот в ОЭЗ на 
отдельные показатели развития территорий. Кроме того, исследуются эффек-
ты применения налоговых льгот при комплексной оценке налогового стимули-
рования, классифицируются показатели количественной оценки эффективно-
сти налоговых льгот на территориях ОЭЗ. Проведенное исследование позволит 
использовать полученные результаты для оценки эффективности налоговых 
льгот на территориях опережающего развития в России. 
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА. Особые экономические зоны; эффективность налоговых 
льгот; методы оценки эффективности налоговых льгот. 
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Table 1 
Studies of tax incentives effect on individual development indicators in territories
Study Subject Findings
A. Klemm and S. Van 
Parys, 2010 [2]. Model 1: 
47 developing countries, 
for the period 1985–2004
Tax incentives / Lower 
corporate income tax 
rate / Tax holidays / In-
vestment tax credit
Lower corporate income tax rates ad tax 
holidays make an impact on the countries, 
while tax credits don not
A. Klemm and S. Van 
Parys, 2010. Model 2: 47 
countries, 1985–2004
Private investment / For-
eign Direct Investment 
(FDI) / Lower corpo-
rate income tax / Tax 
holidays / Investment tax 
credit
A 10 percentage point increase of the CIT 
rate lowers FDI by 0,3 percentage points 
of GDP. Over ten years of tax holidays 
increase FDI by 0,7 % of GDP. Tax credits 
have no effect on FDI. None of the three 
variables increases private investment
A. Klemm and S. Van 
Parys, 2010. 80 coun-
tries, 2005–2008
FDI / Income tax rate Lower effective tax rate increases FDI, 
especially when the business climate 
improves
S. Van Parys and 
S. James, 2010 [3]. 7 Ca-
ribbean countries, 
1997–2007
Tourism invest-
ment / Corporate tax ex-
emptions for 5 to 25 years 
in Antigua and Barbuda
The extension of corporate tax exemp-
tions in Antigua and Barbuda provided 
a significantly bigger increase in tourism 
investment than in other countries
A. Caiumi, 2011 [4]. 
Italy, Piedmont
Investment / Productiv-
ity / Regional investment 
tax credit
Positive effect on investment. Positive 
impact on productivity at the firm level
J. Kolko and D. Neu-
mark, 2009 [5]. USA, 
California
Employment / Tax incen-
tives, especially hiring tax 
credits
Positive employment effects in some areas. 
Generally speaking, the tax incentives does 
not encourage job growth. The authors sug-
gest an improvement to fiscal incentives
D. Bondonio and 
R. Greenbaum, 2006 [6]. 
USA, 11 states
Employment, investment, 
sales and payroll per em-
ployee / Tax incentives
Increases in employment in new establish-
ments are offset by losses in established 
firms
D. Bondonio and 
R. Greenbaum, 2012. 
Italy, Piedmont
Employment / Cash 
subsidies
An increase in employment. Bigger subsi-
dies encourage job growth
P. Givord et al, 2011 [7]. 
France
Employment / Business 
creation / Tax exemption 
on income, property, local 
taxes and social insurance
A low impact on employment is attributed 
to the relocation of businesses to dis-
tressed areas as small firms
R. Chirinko and 
D. Wilson, 2008 [8]. Tax 
credits / Investment
State investment tax cred-
its, investment
Tax incentives in bordering states offsets 
or reduces the limited positive effect
D. Artana, 2013 [9]. 
The free zones in Costa 
Rica, El Salvador and 
Dominican Repub-
lic, 2005–2012
Comparison of firms with 
and without fiscal incen-
tives through analysis of 
three variables: the level 
of earnings, inter-annual 
growht, and the profit level
Companies enjoying tax incentives did 
not exhibit improved productivity in 
comparison with firms that did not have 
them. Empirical evidence suggests that the 
opposite is true for small firms
identify the spatially lagged dependent 
variable. The tax incentives proved to be 
more effective in Latin America and the 
Caribbean countries than in Africa, and 
the authors concluded that the institu-
tional environment was important for 
promoting investment [11]. 
S. Van Parys and S. James [3] analyzed 
the effect of tax incentives in the tourism 
sector and noted that the study did not 
look at the cost of capital or the impact 
of tax incentives on welfare [6]. The au-
thors obtained data from the Price Water-
house Coopers worldwide summaries of 
corporate taxes, macroeconomic and FDI 
data by sector by the Eastern Caribbean 
Central Bank (ECCB). They employed 
econometric panel data analysis technique 
known as ‘difference in differences’ with 
country-fixed effects. 
The study of A. Caiumi [4] is notable 
because along with assessing the effect of 
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tax incentives on investment it also looks 
at how they impact productivity. She em-
ploys the difference-in-differences meth-
od using tax return data. Despite positive 
effect that locally provided investment tax 
credits have on investment and produc-
tion, the author draws pessimistic conclu-
sion that the state loses are significantly 
more in terms of tax revenues than it gains 
by attracting investment.
J. Kolko and D. Neumark [5] study the 
impact of various non-tax factors in 42 en-
terprise zones in California. The authors 
employ the «difference-in-differences» 
method for two factors with a variety of 
control groups and overdetermined re-
gressions, drawing upon data from a 
survey of companies. The study proves 
that fiscal tools didn’t spur employment 
in general, but there was some positive 
impact on employment in certain areas. 
The authors proved that the job-creating 
impact was more significant in enterprise 
zones that had a relatively low share of 
manufacturing employment, while en-
terprise zones were more likely to boost 
employment when local administrators 
devoted relatively more effort to market-
ing and outreach activities.
D. Bondonio и R. Greenbaum [6] 
studied the impact of hiring incentives 
that companies in the north of Italy had 
received for three years through the Euro-
pean Promotion Programme. The authors 
employ the «difference-in-differences» 
method and data from a European Promo-
tion Program-sponsored census. The au-
thors find that the impact on employment 
increases with the amount of the subsidy: 
from approximately two additional work-
ers per firm with benefits below 10 000 eu-
ros to seven workers per firm with benefits 
greater than 70 000 euros.
P. Givord [7] examines the impact on 
employment of tax incentives that are pro-
vided to businesses in the economically 
distressed regions of France. The author 
uses the estimation strategy of «differ-
ence-in-differences» regressions that draw 
upon census data and fiscal databases. Tax 
incentives included five-year exemption 
from income tax, property tax, local busi-
ness taxes and social security contribu-
tions. The author observes that tax rebates 
had a modest effect on employment and 
concludes that the introduction of incen-
tives spurred the relocation of companies 
from other regions of France.
D. Artana studies the impact of tax 
incentives offered to companies in Costa 
Rica, El Salvador and Dominican Repub-
lic on three variables: the level of sales 
of firms, the level of inter-annual growth 
they had, and the profit level [9]. The au-
thor uses a dynamic panel data model 
with dependent variables. The estimation 
shows that companies which receive tax 
incentives do not exhibit higher produc-
tivity than non-incentivised firms. 
Analysis of comprehensive assess-
ments of tax incentives effectiveness in 
SEZs is shown in Table 2. Jin Wang [10] 
tracks the evolution of China’s municipali-
ty level economics before, during and after 
the expansion of special economic zones. 
The author classifies 326 municipalities 
into four groups based on their timing of 
carrying out the SEZ experiment. Group 1 
is composed of municipalities which were 
exposed to the SEZ reform in the early 
1980s (1980–1985). Group 2 is composed 
of municipalities which had the SEZ ex-
periment in the late 1980s (1986–1990). 
Group 3 is composed of municipalities 
which were granted the SEZ experiment 
in the early 1990s (1991–1995). Group 4 in-
cludes municipalities which has been im-
plementing the SEZ reform since the late 
1990s. To estimate the impact of SEZs on 
the development of municipalities, infor-
mation on GDP, investment, employment, 
foreign direct investment, exports were 
used and a digital GIS map of the Chinese 
municipalities was drawn up according 
to the year when SEZ was created. The 
findings suggest that SEZs not only attract 
investment, but also bring in advanced 
technology and ensure economic growth. 
The SEZ policy also increases foreign di-
rect investment per capita by 58 %, main-
ly in the form of foreign investment and 
export-oriented industrial enterprises; it 
does not crowd out domestic investment 
and domestically owned capital stock and 
increases total factor productivity growth 
rate by 0,6 percentage points [10].
Journal of Tax Reform. 2016. T. 2, № 3. С. 168–178
172
ISSN 2412-8872
S. Alder, L. Shao, F. Zilibotti [12] study 
the effect of special economic zones on the 
economic development of 276 China’s 
municipalities between 1988 and 2010. 
The authors carry out a «difference-in-
differences» estimation. They find that the 
establishment of a SEZ is associated with 
an increase in the level of GDP of about 
20 % and boosts total factor productivity, 
investment and human capital. The au-
thors point to the critical role of the state 
in ensuring success of SEZs through mar-
ket liberalisation, promoting investment 
and introducing innovation. The govern-
ment’s industrial policy that included tax 
incentives was a catalyst for the develop-
ment of cutting-edge production facilities 
in China, which had a positive effect on 
the national economics as a whole. The au-
thors also find positive spillover effects of 
SEZs on neighbouring regions and cities.
Proposed methodology and its novelty
Even in case of a successful applica-
tion of tax incentives, the cost of tax ad-
vantages (tax expenditures) might exceed 
benefits of attracting investment. Before 
studying the effectiveness of tax incen-
tives in a SEZ, one should estimate their 
effects. When conducting a comprehen-
sive assessment of SEZ tax incentive pol-
icy, scholars identify effects of tax incen-
tives on economics, tax revenues, welfare 
and infrastructure [10–12]. Depending on 
the area of application, I. A. Mayburov 
differentiates between the effects of tax 
incentives on tax revenues, welfare, eco-
nomics, public funds, and the environ-
ment [13, p. 169]. Each indicator of tax 
incentives effectiveness could serve as 
a criterion for deciding on the effective-
ness (or ineffectiveness) of a tax incen-
tive. However, for the tax incentive to be 
considered effective, it seems sufficient to 
have only one type of effects, i.e., to ob-
serve a growth of one of the indicators to a 
level that exceeds tax expenditures, which 
will constitute a positive effect [14]. 
The author notes that distinguishing 
the effect on the environment might be 
disputable due to quantification issues, 
but seems inevitable in the future.
To assess the effectiveness of tax in-
centives, their effects are presented as 
quantifiable indicators (Table 3).
Table 3
Effects of tax incentives for purposes  
of comprehensive assessment  
of SEZ incentive policy
Effect Indicator
Eco-
nomics
Gross regional product annual 
growth;
Foreign direct investment growth;
Output growth;
Labour productivity growth;
Fixed investment dynamics, etc.
Tax rev-
enue
Public income growth driven by tax 
incentives; 
Subsequent tax revenues exceed 
current tax expenditures;
Tax expenditures cost less than 
provision of state subsidies; 
Public revenue shortfalls over the 
previous and current periods etc.
Welfare Higher average wage;
Growth in new jobs; 
Higher employment rate; 
Better education level;
Income inequality reduced, etc.
Infra-
struc-
ture
More km of roads per square km of 
area ratio;
Electricity and gas supply net-
works;
Expansion of transportation and 
communication systems, etc.
Table 2
Comprehensive study of the effectiveness of special economic zones
Study Subject Findings
J. Wang, 2009. 326 
China’s municipalities 
between 1978–2007
GDP, investment, em-
ployment, FDI, exports, 
labor productivity
SEZs not only drives capital flows, but also 
spurs innovation. The share of FDI and export- 
driven businesses increased by 58 % per capita
S. Alder, L. Shao, 
F. Zilibotti, 2015. 276 
Chinese cities between 
1988–2010
The effect on SEZs on 
economic development 
of municipalities
During the first ten years of the operation of 
the SEZ the city GRP per capita grew by 13 % 
and by 18 % in subsequent years. There was a 
positive effect on productivity, investment, and 
human capital. The impact on neighboring mu-
nicipalities tend to intensify in the course of time
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The effect on economics is shown by 
economic development indicators and 
financial and economic indicators of tax-
payers’ operational performance. The 
welfare effect reflects the social implica-
tions of tax incentives in SEZ. The effect 
on public revenues indicates the impact of 
tax incentives on the government budget. 
The effect on infrastructure reflects the de-
velopment and reliability of infrastructure 
in the area. 
It is possible to estimate the effective-
ness of a tax incentive by looking at the 
degree of its projected effect. If it exceeds 
the tax expenditures, i.e., if the effect is 
positive, or if all indicators have increased 
in monetary terms, it means the tax incen-
tive has been effective. Another factor of 
effectiveness is the quality of institutional 
environment in the region and the effec-
tiveness of oversight authorities. Unfor-
tunately, these indicators are not subject 
to regular statistical surveys in Russia’s 
regions. However, there appears to be a 
considerable diversity among the Russian 
regions in terms of their institutional char-
acteristics. The Corruption Perceptions 
Index published by Transparency Inter-
national places Russia at the 119th place 
(among 168 countries) [15]. There are no 
indicators that would take into account 
political (transparency, election), econom-
ic (liberalization, corruption), and social 
factors (media independence, maturity 
of civil society, culture and local govern-
ment) in each region of Russia. 
The effectiveness of tax incentives 
in special economic zones is difficult to 
quantify. Four different types of direct 
costs are distinguished when performing 
a comprehensive assessment of tax incen-
tives in SEZs:
– tax revenue shortfalls due to tax in-
centives (tax expenditures);
– resource allocation costs (additional 
investment in creation competitive markets 
that increases government expenditures; 
– enforcement and compliance costs 
(tax administration costs); 
– costs associated with corruption and 
lack of transparency (manual control over 
tax incentives in SEZs drives up costs as-
sociated with corruption) [11].
Being one of the common ways of as-
sessing the effectiveness of incentive poli-
cies in SEZs, method of cost-benefit analy-
sis implies that the costs of implementing 
a SEZ project are estimated in terms of the 
volume of investments that were made 
thanks to tax incentives, revenue foregone, 
and direct financial subsidies. Studies that 
employed the approach do not provide a 
true measure of efficiency, because they 
measure only the costs, and not the jobs 
created, technology transfer, etc.
To measure costs and benefits associ-
ated with investment, the following indi-
cators are taken into account: 
– the volume of investment that could 
potentially be undertaken if investors do 
not receive any incentives; 
– «leakages» from the tax base in-
duced by tax incentives, or the relocation 
of tax payers to tax-free zones;
– tax revenue from tax payers that 
continue to benefit from tax incentives 
beyond the period of exemption, or from 
other activities [16].
The method of cost-output analysis is 
essentially identical to the method of cost-
benefit analysis, but its main difference 
lies in the use of physical rather than mon-
etary units for measuring benefits. The re-
sults of the analysis are easy to interpret. 
The main approaches to improve the 
quality of the estimation of tax incentives 
in SEZs include creation of tax incentive 
budgets and tax expenditure reports [17]. 
In order to compile a unified tax incentive 
budget, a single coordinated approach 
is needed to identify all expenditures on 
public authorities that are involved in SEZ 
governance (SEZ projects approvals, in-
vestment monitoring services, tax control 
services etc.). The majority of countries, 
taxation authorities are not responsible for 
designing and administering tax incen-
tives program in special economic zones. 
As a rule, among public authorities that 
are in charge of approving SEZ projects 
and monitoring investment are several 
departments Ministry of Economics, for-
eign investment agencies etc. Main goal of 
these services is to make sure that inves-
tors are coming in, rather than to protect 
the tax base and ensure tax revenue. A tax 
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expenditure budget makes it possible to 
carry out general analysis of direct and in-
direct tax expenditures on a SEZ project. 
Analysis of study results
The effectiveness of tax incentives in 
SEZs is directly related to the investment 
climate in the country, as well as to eco-
nomical and political issues, inadequate 
protection of property rights, or a poor-
ly functioning legal system. SEZs have 
proved to be ineffective in the majority of 
African countries due to ineffective infra-
structure and ineffective institutions [18]. 
Studies conducted in India find that 
the number of SEZs in the region had 
negligible effect on economic growth [19]. 
Moreover, there is significant risk that the 
national income might shrink following 
the establishment of SEZs. In 2000, the In-
dian government cancelled tax incentives 
for exporters, and granted exemption only 
to residents of special export-oriented 
economic zones. That spurred mass tax 
evasion. Despite insignificant decrease in 
sales, exporters’ profits before tax halved, 
while their subsidiaries which were reg-
istered in SEZs reported a 100 percent in-
crease in profits. 
Studies seeking to establish a direct 
link between the tax burden and FDI 
prove that taxes have a considerable im-
pact on the volume of investment in SEZ 
in developed countries. A study by A. Kl-
emm and S. Van Parys that covered 47 de-
veloping countries between 1985 and 2004 
finds that 10 percentage point increase of 
the CIT rate lowers FDI by 0,3 percentage 
points of GDP. Over ten years of tax holi-
days FDI increase by 0,7 % of GDP. Simi-
lar investigations in developing countries 
generally reveal less correlation between 
Indicators above [3; 20]. One of the key 
reasons for that are unattractive condi-
tions for investing that scared away mul-
tinational companies: underdeveloped 
infrastructure, low living standards, lack 
of political and economic stability, lack of 
legal transparency, weak judicial system 
etc. In such cases it is difficult to make 
up for the unfavorable business climate 
by providing tax incentives. Yet tax in-
centives remain one of the most effective 
development instruments for low-income 
economics [16].
The effective application of tax incen-
tives in SEZs is measured by taking ac-
count of associated costs and considering 
whether the project has reached its goals. 
An increase in investment, including FDI, 
is usually a necessary but not a sufficient 
prerequisite for development. The ef-
fectiveness of tax incentives is a result of 
taxes imposed by the SEZ, but also of a tax 
burden in other countries, including the 
investor’s home country and neighboring 
regions. Our review of foreign literature 
on the subject of tax incentives in special 
economic zones shows that when assess-
ing the effectiveness of tax incentive poli-
cies in special economic zones the follow-
ing estimation methods are used:
– econometric models;
– statistical methods of effectiveness 
assessment.
The statistical estimation techniques 
are simple methods of quantitative evalu-
ation of SEZs. One can recommend them 
for use at the early stages of analysis. 
Among the most commonly used indica-
tors of statistical estimation methods are:
– calculation of mean values;
– time series: absolute change, relative 
change, growth rate, change trends;
– combination and grouping of eco-
nomic indicators by certain features; 
– competitive comparison over a time 
span; 
– inflation indices (deflators); 
– graphical methods. 
Statistical methods are essentially 
about studying the statistics economic ef-
fects along with the amount of tax expendi-
tures in SEZs, establishing the volume and 
frequency of obtaining a certain economic 
result and producing the most reliable 
prediction. The statistical methods draw 
upon big data and require preliminary 
grouping of facts by shared attributes. For 
example, simple linear regressions com-
prise a large number of lagged variables; 
large amount of information also requires 
to conduct series of treatments. Simple lin-
ear regressions that are designed to reveal 
the impact of taxes on the economics are 
subject to identification problems and lim-
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itations. The identification problem means 
that a simple model cannot identify the 
impact of a discretionary decision of the 
country government as whether to intro-
duce a tax incentive. This brings about an 
endogeneity problem in a model when it 
is impossible to definitely state that fluctu-
ations in tax revenues affect economic dy-
namics expressed, for example, by GDP, 
rather than vice versa. 
The limitations of such models are 
due to the fact that it is impossible to take 
account of shocks in variables that occur 
outside the model, but have a strong ef-
fect on the structure and pace of economic 
changes. For example, when analyzing 
tax incentives in a SEZ it is necessary take 
into account government investment in 
territorial development. This requires 
use of complex dynamic models that help 
mitigate the endogeneity problem and 
describe economic linkages. Economic 
processes develop over time, so the issues 
of analysis and forecasting in time series, 
including mulita-variate ones, hold an im-
portant place in econometrics. The opera-
tional performance of SEZs depends on a 
large number of parameters, which makes 
it difficult to describe the structure of link-
ages between these parameters. 
In such cases the application of eco-
nomic and mathematical modelling meth-
ods is not only appropriate, but essential. 
Our overview of approaches to analysing 
the effectiveness of tax incentives in SEZ 
shows that the most commonly used es-
timation methods are dynamic panel re-
gressions, panel data models with fixed 
effects and the «difference-in-differences» 
technique. 
A big advantage of dynamic panel re-
gression models over simple regressions 
includes possibility to obtain a large num-
ber of observations over a relatively short 
term horizon by incorporating micro data 
in calculations. In SEZ investigations, mi-
cro data sets are extracted from surveys of 
enterprise zone based firms. 
Panel regression models can take the 
form of fixed effects models
Yit = X’itb + αi + εit,
random effects models
Yit = X’itb + uit;
uit = αi + εit,
where Yit is the dependent variable; X’it is 
the deterministic (non-random) variable; 
εit is the random (stochastic) component 
(error term).
In fixed effects models, αi is the inter-
cept that takes on different values for each 
unit. The intercept represents the effect of 
omitted or unobserved variables that de-
scribe individual characteristics of units 
that do not change over time.
In random effects models, αi, also rep-
resents the effect of omitted or unobserved 
variables that describe individual char-
acteristics of units, but in this case such 
individual differences are random, their 
average values are balanced and their 
variances are identical across samples. 
Apart from different interpretations 
of the intercept, models have different 
methods of estimating regression coeffi-
cients. The fixed effects model allows for 
data endogeneity, that is, coefficients are 
estimated when X’it is correlated with αi. 
The random effects model implies that 
explanatory variables in each time period 
are uncorrelated with the error (exogene-
ity), which is a fairly strict assumption. 
Weaker exogeneity of variables in the 
fixed effects models yields coefficients 
that are consistent, but ineffective. That 
means that the estimation method does 
not produce a minimal variation of coef-
ficients, hence errors as to their statistical 
significance. This happens because the 
fixed effects model does not use the entire 
variation across the data cluster, but only 
within-entity variation. Between-entity 
variation is ignored. The random effects 
model exploits across-cluster variation 
and produces effective estimations, that 
might, however be biased in the case of a 
strong correlation between the error term 
and explanatory variables [13, p. 165]. 
Our review of approaches to estimat-
ing the effectiveness of tax incentives in 
special economic zones shows that the 
«difference-in-differences» technique is 
often employed for the purpose. This 
might be due to the difficulty of doing a 
pure experiment for investigating cause-
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and-effect linkages between tax incentives 
and indicators being studied.
The technique estimates fixed effects 
in aggregate data. Using the DD method 
makes it possible to eliminate omitted 
variable bias by controlling for unob-
served omitted characteristics while incor-
porating observed parameters of entities 
into the model [21]. 
J. Wooldridge explains that «the sim-
plest set up is one where outcomes are 
observed for two groups for two time 
periods. One of the groups is exposed to 
a treatment in the second period but not 
in the first period. The second group is 
not exposed to the treatment during ei-
ther period. In the case where the same 
units within a group are observed in each 
time period, the average gain in the sec-
ond (control) group is substracted from 
the average gain in the first (treatment) 
group. This removes biases in second pe-
riod comparisons between the treatment 
and control group that could be the re-
sult from permanent differences between 
those groups, as well as biases from com-
parisons over time in the treatment group 
that could be the result of trends» [22]. 
Technically, the DD method estimates 
the effect of SEZ projects as a difference 
between Y (an indicator, e.g., GRP) in two 
points in time for two groups of regions: 
the treatment one where the SEZ are being 
implemented, and the control one where 
no projects occur (AC = AB – CB).
The standard DD model can be ex-
pressed as a regression equation:
Yi = β0 + β1Pi + β2Ti + β3PiTi + ΣjαjXij + εi,
where i — indexes the region; j — indexes 
an auxiliary factor variable; Yi is the indi-
cator; Pi is a dummy that is equal to one 
for time period 2 (later observation), and 
equal to zero for time period 1 (calculation 
period); Ti is a dummy that is equal to 1 
for regions from the treatment group, and 
equal to zero for regions from the control 
group; Xij are auxiliary factor variables; εi 
is a random (stochastic) component (error 
term; β0, β1, β2, β3, αj are the regression 
coefficients; β0 is the mean value of GRP 
for control group regions during period 1; 
β0 + β1 is the mean value of the indicator 
for control group regions during period 2; 
β0 + β2 is the mean value of the indicator 
for treatment group regions during period 
1; β0 + β1 + β2 + β3 is the mean value of 
the indicator for treatment group regions 
during period 2; β3 d is the difference-in-
differences estimate (effect).
The models could include regional-
scale fixed effects, which makes it possible 
to balance the special (first difference) and 
temporal (second difference) heterogene-
ity that is unrelated to the regional SEZ. 
Consequently, DD estimation makes it 
possible to assess growth determinants 
that are specific to a particular territory 
and a particular time frame.
Conclusions
A survey of recent foreign research 
into tax incentives in special economic 
zones shows a wide array of approaches 
to the subject. The effectiveness of tax 
incentives in SEZs is assessed from the 
point of view of associated expenditures 
as well as whether the projects in ques-
tion meet their objectives. One of the 
key problems of effect manifestation and 
estimation has to do with the difficulty 
of establishing the time lag that is quite 
unique to each incentive. The effects of 
tax incentives usually occur in the mid-
term or even long-term run. The main 
problem with estimating tax incentives is 
carrying out an analysis of the SEZ effec-
tiveness without tax incentives and con-
structing models that would isolate the 
effects of tax incentives from the impact 
of other factors and variables.
By employing the method of cost-ben-
efit analysis for assessing the effectiveness 
of tax incentives in a SEZ, it is possible to 
perform a comprehensive analysis of the 
SEZ and estimate aggregate long-term ef-
fect by determining the present value of 
net benefits by discounting it at a discount 
rate. The complexity of the method arises 
from the lack of an objective opportunity 
to estimate individual effects and out-
comes in monetary values. For example, 
it is difficult to quantify benefits of public 
expenditures. Additionally, irregular sta-
tistical observations make the cost of col-
lecting information unreasonably high. 
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The «difference-in-differences» meth-
od is widely used for analyzing perfor-
mance of special economic zones in order 
to assess cause-effect linkages (А. Caiumi, 
D. Bondonio and R. Greenbaum, P. Givo-
rd [4; 6; 7]. Studies by S. Alder, L. Shao, 
A. Klemm and S. Van Parys show that the 
econometric methods are fraught with the 
problem of identifying and taking into ac-
count the time lag) [2; 12]. 
Panel data that are used in the «dif-
ference-in-differences» technique make 
it possible to remove the unobserved 
heterogeneity in the sample when the 
omitted variables are fixed in time inside 
the SEZ. That means that the treatment 
and control groups should be exposed 
to the same tax incentives and respond 
to them «in parallel». For example, when 
conducting their research, S. Van Parys 
and S. James used the DD method with 
country-fixed factors [3]; J. Kolko and 
D. Neumark used the DD method for two 
factors in different control groups and 
overdetermined regressions [5]. 
In other words, in the absence of an ef-
fect from tax incentives in both treatment 
and control groups of SEZs, the model 
definitely yields different coefficient es-
timates, but estimates should change in 
parallel over time during the considered 
period. The conditions have to be ob-
served in order to make sure that it was 
only the effect of tax incentives that could 
change the trend in the treatment group 
when compared to the control group. 
Panel data ensure higher precision of 
estimation, make it possible to study the 
change in dynamics and individual char-
acteristics of the units in the sample; they 
can identify and measure effects that can-
not be traced in time series or spatial data 
only. For example, research by J. Wang 
and A. Klemm, S. Van Parys, who use a 
lagged model with fixed effects that is 
estimated with instrumental variables, 
take into account distance between prov-
inces / countries to determine how neigh-
bouring provinces or bordering countries 
influence one another. 
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